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Broadening the Focus
Abstract
Over the past dozen or so years neuroethics has become a rich and dynamic field that has brought
together individuals from a variety of disciplines and interests to consider issues that lie at the
intersection of ethics and neuroscience. During this period there has been a significant amount of
important empirical and philosophical work on a range of topics at this intersection; however, there has
been comparatively little work on this intersection as it applies to nonhuman animals. In fact, it is fair to
say that neuroethics has had a distinct and almost exclusive “humanistic focus.” Our hope with this
special section is to broaden this focus and to provoke and encourage discussion of nonhuman animals
within neuroethics.
There are a number of explanations for neuroethics’ humanistic focus.

Disciplines
Animal Studies | Bioethics and Medical Ethics | Neuroscience and Neurobiology | Neurosciences

Comments
Special Section: Neuroethics and Animals

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/neuroethics_pubs/105

Special Section: Neuroethics and Animals

Guest Editorial
Broadening the Focus
TOM BULLER, ADAM SHRIVER, and MARTHA FARAH

The Humanistic Focus
Over the past dozen or so years neuroethics has become a rich and dynamic field
that has brought together individuals from a variety of disciplines and interests to
consider issues that lie at the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. During this
period there has been a significant amount of important empirical and philosophical
work on a range of topics at this intersection; however, there has been comparatively little work on this intersection as it applies to nonhuman animals. In fact, it
is fair to say that neuroethics has had a distinct and almost exclusive “humanistic
focus.” Our hope with this special section is to broaden this focus and to provoke
and encourage discussion of nonhuman animals within neuroethics.
There are a number of explanations for neuroethics’ humanistic focus.
Mind and Agent
According to a familiar description, neuroethics examines issues pertaining to the
ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics.1 Within the first of these
elements, discussion has focused on a variety of existing and future neuroscientific interventions that enable the monitoring and manipulation of the brain,
for example, the use of neuroimaging to “read” the brain and detect thoughts,
lies, and other psychological states, and the use of pharmacological and other
means to enhance cognition. Discussion of these interventions has focused, in
particular, on potential invasions of privacy and threats to “cognitive liberty,” and
concerns about authenticity and fairness.
Underlying the interest in the monitoring and manipulation of the brain lies a
humanistic view of mind: to have a mind is to have thoughts, beliefs, and other
“higher-level” psychological states, and these states are generally accessible only
in a privileged first-person way. What interests and concerns us about neuroimaging
is that it can, in principle, reveal a person’s conscious inner mental life; that is to
say, it can access mental intentions and other mental contents that we previously
thought to be private. Similarly, the worry that cognitive enhancement poses a
threat to authenticity presupposes that there is an authentic self, and authenticity
is commonly understood in terms of psychological integration.
If this is correct, it is obvious why neuroethics has had little interest in nonhuman animals. For a common belief in regard to the minds of animals is that
they lack such a sophisticated conscious mental life. In general, we may be quite
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willing to accept that animals are sentient, that they have preferences, and that
there is a rich variety of animal cognition; but we are skeptical that they have thoughts
and beliefs. This skepticism is aided by a fear of uncritical anthropomorphism.
In regard to the second of the aforementioned elements—the neuroscience of
ethics—the matter is, perhaps, even clearer. One of the core questions that has
been addressed is, “What are the implications that advances in neuroscience have
for the law and morality?” This question is, obviously, dependent on the initial
belief that we are, for the most part, intentional agents capable of moral decisionmaking and acting responsibly, and that the law and morality assume this to be
the case. Our initial belief about nonhuman animals, however, is that it is inappropriate to view them in this light: the behavior of nonhuman animals is judged
to be predominantly instinctive or hardwired, rather than intentional and voluntary. This is not to deny that some animals, for example, chimps, have complex
social and group behaviors and are capable of morally questionable actions like
deception, but even in these cases we are reluctant to conceive of these animals as
moral agents.
Epistemic and Methodological Concerns
One of the reasons why neuroscience is thought to be compelling, and, perhaps,
challenging, is because it is thought to be in a privileged position to explain the
mind. Although there may be no agreement as to the specific relationship between
mind and brain, within neuroethics there is general agreement that this relationship is
robust, if not even necessary. In broad terms neuroethics follows neuroscience in
adopting an internalist, brain-based understanding of the mind. Accordingly, we
seek to identify the neural processes that underlie psychological states, and these
processes are viewed as evidence of what is “really going on.” For conceptual and
practical reasons, however, a different approach has been adopted in regard to
animal cognition. In contrast to the internalist perspective of the human mind, the
approach taken to the study of animal minds has been broader and more externalist
in nature. For example, one of the influential approaches to the study of animal
minds, cognitive ethology, supports the “comparative, evolutionary and ecological study of animal thought processes.”2 In other words, in order to understand
the animal mind, we should take fully into account the place and nature of the
animal within its natural environment and evolutionary history, in addition to
focusing on the underlying neurophysical states.
Furthermore, as we are aware, there are substantial practical and ethical challenges to the study of animal minds. Our ability to use neuroimaging to “read”
a person’s thoughts is in part the result of our ability to design highly structured
and specific tasks, and of the subject’s ability to comprehend and follow what he
or she is being asked to do. To take a somewhat fanciful example, during the 2010
World Cup, Paul the Octopus showed a remarkable ability to predict the results of
matches during the tournament—he guessed 8/8 matches correctly. It is fair to say
that there is considerable debate about the validity of Paul’s predictions, with critics pouring scorn on the claimed abilities of this cephalopod. If Paul were human,
then we could, in theory (and maybe in practice) use neuroimaging to determine
whether he does genuinely recognize the flags of various countries, or, perhaps,
whether he is making a decision or has a preference for one outcome rather
than another. Because Paul is a cephalopod, however, and, according to our
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understanding, lacking in the appropriate cognitive and linguistic capacities to
participate in an experiment that could, in principle, determine what is “really
going on,” we cannot readily use neuroimaging to validate his “predictions” or
determine whether, in fact, he is making any predictions at all.
There is also a further challenge presented by nonhuman animal minds, namely,
their difference from human minds. Our ability to identify the neural processes
that underlie mental events rests, in considerable part, on our familiarity with the
human brain and its very specific functions. This familiarity can be confirmed
or revised through the use of further neuroscientific investigation, particularly
neuroimaging, and enables us to discover the empirical correlations. In the case of
nonhuman animals we can gain some understanding of their minds through comparison of brain architecture and function to human and other animal minds;
however, the more different the animal mind is from the human mind, the more
difficult it will be to understand the animal mind.
The Scope of Animal Neuroethics
A reasonable definition of animal neuroethics would encompass all of the ethical
issues raised by neuroscience in connection with animals. These arise from the
many different ways in which humans intervene on animal brains.
The most common goal of brain interventions with animals is the reduction of
unwanted behaviors that arise in reaction to their human-controlled environments.
Pets and zoo animals often endure severely restricted freedom of movement, and
confinement of livestock in factory farms is extreme, with enclosures so small or
crowding so dense that an individual may be unable to turn. These environments
cause anxiety, aggression toward other animals and humans, and compulsive selfinjurious behaviors. Psychopharmacology has been used to lessen these problem
behaviors in pets, zoo animals, and livestock, with a marked increase in the use
of neuropsychiatric medications such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors,
tricyclic antidepressants, and benzodiazepines in pets.3
Animals are also used as subjects in medical research on neurological and
psychiatric disorders and in basic research on the brain, generally as models for
human beings. Although all animal research raises ethical dilemmas, research on
animal brains evokes some unique quandaries. Such research affects animals’
experience more directly than research on other bodily systems, and research
involving the important but aversive phenomena of pain, depression, and anxiety
is especially problematic.4 In addition, the greater the similarity of an animal
species’ brain to the human brain, the more valid the model, and also the greater
the likelihood of awareness and risk of suffering.
A distinctive set of issues arise in connection with relatively new research methods for crossing boundaries between species and between animals and machines.
These include the creation of transgenic animals whose brain function has been
altered by genes from a different species and neural chimera, in which an animal
incorporates functioning neural tissue from another species.5 They also include
brain–machine interfaces, in which animals’ brains are implanted with electrodes
that enable brain activity to control robotic devices.6
Finally, neuroscience is giving us new ways of inferring the psychological states
of animals, including the state of suffering. These developments build on endocrine and autonomic nervous system measures of stress to include measures of
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central nervous system function from postmortem samples or functional brain
imaging.7,8 Such developments have the potential to move forward the debate
over whether, and to what extent, animals suffer.
Special Section on Neuroethics and Animals
The articles that are included in this section focus on two issues that are central to
the discussion of neuroethics and animals: the use of animals in research and sentience and the moral status of animals. In his article, Andrew Fenton argues that
we should adopt a different moral framework in regard to the use of chimpanzees
in research. According to Fenton, chimpanzees have the capacity to dissent from
participating in research, because they possess the capacity to feel pain, can anticipate future occurrences of pain and distress, and can express the preference that
the pain be stopped. In this regard, although there are substantial differences
between chimpanzees and children, these capacities suggest that the appropriate
perspective that should be adopted in regard to the use of chimpanzees in research
is through the lens of pediatric ethics. In their article, Michael Rollin and Bernard
Rollin question the validity and ethics of animal models of human psychiatric
disease. In broad terms, we may say that the use of animals in research is justified
(if at all) to the extent to which the animal can be legitimately be regarded as a
valid model, that is to say, the extent to which the information gained in the
research can be appropriately translated to the human context. Rollin and Rollin
argue, however, that this condition cannot be met, because “the shaky construct
validity of the diseases as described in humans renders them impossible to translate to animal models.” Furthermore, if there were a valid animal model, then this
would mean that the phenomenology of the animal’s experience would be closely
similar to a human’s; but if this were the case, then one might wonder what moral
difference exists between animal and human.
The articles by Adam Shriver and by Sherry Loveless and James Giordano focus
on the matter of animal pain. In his article, Shriver argues that, contrary to a common understanding, there are good reasons to think that pleasure and pain are not
“symmetrical,” that is to say, that pleasure is not simply the absence of pain.
Rather, the evidence suggests, as Shriver states, that “pleasure and pain are not
just two different experiences but in fact are two wholly different types of experience.” Accordingly, as Shriver argues, pain and pleasure might not be measurable
along a single scale, and, hence, we should be wary of judging actions in terms of
the ratio of pleasure to pain. This conclusion has important implications for animal
research, for it suggests that the use of animals in research that seeks to minimize
suffering in humans should be viewed differently than the use of animals in
research that seeks to understand positive experiences. The issue of an animal’s
capacity to feel pain is central to the article by Loveless and Giordano. In their
article, the authors argue that an organism’s capacity to feel pain “represents a
minimum criterion on which to base and predicate moral consideration and
actions,” and that there is clear neuroscientific evidence to conclude that animals
can feel pain, fear, and distress. Furthermore, this means that we have a responsibility to develop and institute protections for animal welfare. Finally, in his article,
Tom Buller attempts to show how a neuroethics framework can inform current
debates about the mentality and moral status of animals and can narrow the
“epistemic gap” between science and ethics. Buller argues that neuroscience can help
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identify properties relevant to the mentality of animals that might satisfy both
science and ethics, and that neuroethics can provide a framework for evaluating
these properties.
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